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INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article, I have explored various reasons why
the homes association might provide a better approach to the
maintenance of common areas and facilities than a condomin-
ium-especially in the case of townhouse developments for
sale.' That article suggests that the condominium provides only
two significant advantages for townhouse developers: (1) in
communities that have no express zoning for this use, town-
houses can usually be developed under the apartment district
regulations so long as the land itself is not subdivided into lots.
This means that townhouses must either be rented or sold in
condominium form; 2 (2) in many areas the word "condominium"
has become associated with luxury living and has acquired a cer-
tain magic appeal on the market.
These advantages, however, are fast disappearing. There
is a wind blowing from Florida that has chilled the condomin-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1951, B.C.L. 1952, Oxford
University; LL.M. 1956, Harvard University. Member, Illinois, Maine, and Pennsylvania
Bars.
I Krasnowiecki, Townhouse Condominiums Compared to Conventional Subdivision with
Homes Association, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 323 (1973).
2 For a possible response to this problem, see text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
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ium market.3 Reports of fraud and overreaching by condo-
minium developers, whether merited or not, have spread
throughout the country. The hue and cry has been taken up by
a number of federal agencies, the FTC, 4 the OILSR,5 even the
IRS.6 Legislation is pending in Congress to bring condominiums
under specific federal controls.
7
Many developers feel that they would do well to look for
some other way to market the townhouse concept. There is re-
newed interest in the homes association approach to townhouse
development-where each townhouse is sold with its own in-
dividual lot in fee and where the common areas are conveyed
in fee to a separate organization for the benefit of the residents.
The common expenses and the common rights and obligations
of the residents are then controlled through recorded covenants
running with the land.
It has therefore occurred to me that it might be useful to re-
view how one puts a homes association together, and how it can
be used in open space community development. The leading
work on this subject is still the Urban Land Institute's Homes As-
sociation Handbook.8 Although the Handbook was published in
1964, I believe that the legal analysis and the Model Forms for
which I am responsible 9 remain essentially sound. The Forms,
of course, were never intended to be more than guidelines for
local counsel to shape and improve. A number of improve-
ments could and will be proposed in this Article. But there was
a central purpose behind the old Forms-to strike a reasonable
balance between the interests of the developer and the interests
of the housing consumer. My feeling then was that the courts
would not enforce covenants which tend to take unfair advan-
tage of the housing consumer, and nothing has happened since
I For an excellent discussion of the abusive consumer practices in Florida and other
jurisdictions, as well as the federal and state responses, see Comment, Condominium Reg-
ulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1975).
1 The FTC is engaged presently in an investigation of condominium developer prac-
tices. [2 Current Developments] BNA Hous. & DEv. REP. 88 (1974).
' See text accompanying notes 121-31 infra.
6 See Emanuel, Condozinium Developers and the Internal Revenue Service-The Florida
Story, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 760 (1974).
S. 4047, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 3658, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 662.
8 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE Ho.IEs ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK, (Tech. Bul. 50,
1964) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
'See id. vii; J. KRASNOWIECKI, LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND FORMS FOR HOMES ASSOCIA-
TIONS (1963).
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1964 that would lead me to change my position. On the con-
trary, I am convinced that if developers do not voluntarily police
the homes association approach, the legislatures and regulatory
agencies will do it for them.' 0
I. TOWNHOUSE CLUSTER: SINGLE PHASE
Usually the developer of a large townhouse project will try
to submit final plans for approval by the local authorities in
phases. This approach to the larger development is dictated by
several considerations: Most local subdivision ordinances re-
quire that basic site improvements-such as streets, drainage,
and grading-shown on a subdivision plan be completed or
guaranteed (by bond or cash escrow) when the plan is finally
submitted for record. In other words, submission of final rec-
ord plans is the event that triggers this expense. Under such
ordinances, the only way in which a developer can defer expen-
ditures on basic site improvements is to present final record
plans for approval in phases.
In addition, the typical subdivision ordinance also requires
that streets and other facilities which are intended for public
maintenance must be dedicated at the time final record plans
are filed. Once a street or other public area has been dedicated
it is a step which is frequently hard to undo, especially when lots
have been sold out of the record plan." Thus, premature re-
cordation has the effect of freezing the land use pattern for the
entire project.
Indeed, there is a long standing doctrine that persons who
buy lots in a recorded subdivision may acquire rights by implica-
tion to areas that appear, on the plan, to be intended for com-
mon use.' 2 In this era of consumer protection, the courts have
shown some disposition to expand that doctrine.' 3 These are
10 The California and New York experiences are illustrative. Regulatory approaches
today apply equally to condominiums and homes associations. CAL- Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 11003, 11004.5 (West Supp. 1974) (applies to any "planned development" which is
defined by the presence of common areas supported by assessments which may become
liens on the individual units); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1968). The
New York Bureau of Securities and Public Financing has taken the position that homes
association developments are "cooperative interests in realty" covered by the registration
provisions of§ 352-e. Letter from David Clurman, Director of the Bureau, to the author,
Sept. 5, 1973.
1 See notes 15-18 infra & accompanying text.
12 See notes 20-23 infra & accompanying text.
" See text accompanying note 20 infra.
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some of the basic reasons why developers prefer to proceed to
the development of larger projects by phases.
14
I will speak of phased development at greater length in
Part II of this Article. For purposes of this Part, I assume that
the development will consist of only one phase. This assump-
tion allows me to concentrate on the basic elements of the homes
association approach without introducing the added complica-
tions that are connected with phasing.
A. The Basic Property Scheme
1. Role of Subdivision Plan
A recorded subdivision plan has two consequences that can
affect the scheme:
a. Dedication to the Public
In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, a
recorded subdivision plan may impliedly dedicate to the public
all those areas shown on the plan that are usually owned and
maintained by the public. Certainly this is true of streets,15 and
the rule has been extended to parks and playgrounds.16 The
courts usually hold that the implied dedication occurs when the
first lot is sold out of the recorded subdivision.
The implied dedication may occur even though the area in
question is not labelled on the plan as a "street,"'17 "park," or
"playground"'18 if its shape suggests that it is such a public area.
Obviously, steps must be taken to assure that the common areas
shown on the recorded plan intended to be conveyed to and
maintained by the association are saved against a possible im-
plied dedication to the public. For this reason, I recommended
in the Homes Association Handbook that a notation be inserted on
11 By way of contrast, this is precisely the problem that condominium statutes do
not solve. Most of the statutes are based on an FHA model law that was drafted for a de-
velopment consisting of a single building. As a result, they do not recognize the need
for phased development nor do they accommodate it. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 1,
at 353-65.
15 Stanfield v. Brewton, 228 Ga. 92, 184 S.E.2d 352 (1971); Adams v. Rowles, 149
Tex. 52, 228 S.W.2d 849 (1950); Harris v. South Portland, 118 Me. 356, 108 A. 326
(1919); Brighton Constr., Inc. v. L. &J. Enterprises, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 152, 296 A.2d
335 (1972).
16 Whilden v. Richie, 42 Del. Ch. 62, 203 A.2d 617 (1964); Picconi v. Carlin, 40 N.J.
Super. 393, 123 A.2d 87 (1956).
'7 City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200 (1884).
"I See Picconi %. Carlin, 40 N.J. Super. 393, 123 A.2d 87 (1956).
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the face of the recorded plan identifying the areas which are
not to be dedicated to the public and stating that these areas
will be conveyed to a homes association as more fully provided
in a Declaration of Covenants and Easements executed and
recorded on the same date.' 9
b. Implied Private Protective Easements
Running parallel to the doctrine which implies a public
dedication of seemingly public areas shown on the plan, is a
doctrine that implies that each purchaser of a lot acquires a pri-
vate easement of use and enjoyment over such areas in com-
mon with the other lot purchasers in the subdivision. So far, the
easements have been confined to common activity areas such as
streets, 20 playgrounds,2 1 and lakes22 shown on the face of the
recorded portions of a subdivision plan.23 If this limitation pre-
vails, a developer can protect his open space and street plan from
being frozen through such implied easements by simply record-
ing his plan in smaller sections (local government permitting).
This, it will be recalled, is one of the reasons for phased devel-
opment. One might question, however, whether the courts will
hold the line between recorded and unrecorded plans, especial-
ly if the latter are actively employed in the sales promotion. This
question as well as others that relate to phased development will
be discussed at length in Part 11.24 Here I have assumed that we
are dealing with a single phase and that the developer is willing
to commit himself fully to all of the representations made in
that phase.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of implied easements is signifi-
cant for the single phase because developers may wish expressly
to limit or enlarge its scope. If the rights of the lot purchasers
in the common areas are left simply to implication, it may be-
come impossible to modify the arrangement without the con-
19 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 197, 382 (Appendix E, Model Form: Dedication of
Common Areas).
2 0 See note 15, supra; Highway Holding Co. v. Yara Eng'r Corp., 22 N.J. 119, 123
A.2d 511 (1956); Rahn v. Hess, 378 Pa. 264, 106 A.2d 461 (1954).
22 See Picconi v. Carlin, 40 N.J. Super. 393, 123 A.2d 87 (1956).
22 Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285, 107 A.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1954).
23 See notes 15-22 supra. Apparently New York takes the position that the implied
rights arise only in favor of those purchasers whose deeds refer to the plan. Weil v. Atlantic
Beach Holding Corp., 131 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 285 App. Div. 1080,
139 N.Y.S.2d 799, affd as modified, 309 N.Y. 772, 128 N.E.2d 813 (1955).
24 See text accompanying note 97 infra.
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sent of every one of the lot owners. Furthermore, the associa-
tion should have the power to suspend members from the
enjoyment of these areas for infraction of its rules and for non-
payment of assessments. An implied easement might not be
subject to such limitations. Consequently the Homes Association
Handbook urges that the enjoyment rights of the residents in
the common areas and facilities should be expressly spelled out,
so that appropriate limitations can also be imposed. This is best
done in the Declaration of Covenants and Easements with an
appropriate reference made on the face of the subdivision plan.2 5
The question is often asked whether the enjoyment rights
should be extended automatically to tenants as well as owners.
I have always felt that the membership rights should be given
to the owners in the first instance with the proviso that the
owner may extend his enjoyment rights to his tenants and to
any member of his family who resides with him. I am aware that
this is an era when failure to champion the cause of tenants is
looked upon with some distaste. But I think that the idea that
tenants automatically get a vote26 in the association or that they
automatically get a right of enjoyment to the common areas and
facilities is troublesome, not because tenants should be denied
these rights but because it seems unwise to separate control
over these rights from the interest in the property that will bear
the long range gain or loss attributable to the use or abuse of
those areas. Obviously I am talking only about who is given con-
trol, not about how it should be exercised.
2. The Declaration of Covenants and Easements
a. Protective Covenants: Architectural Review
There are many restrictive or "protective" covenants that
a developer might wish to include in the Declaration for the
purpose of regulating the use and appearance of the commu-
nity. Protective covenants of this sort are not unique to a homes
association scheme. Nor do they involve any difficult legal ques-
tions. Attorneys drafting such covenants should consult the
25 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 197, 382 (Appendix E, Model Form: Dedication of
Common Areas); id. 387 (Appendix F, Model Form: Declaration of Covenants and Re-
strictions, Article IV).
26 This is the one small modification which Community Management Corporation
has made in my original HANDBOOK forms. See COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT CORP., MODEL
LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR COMMUNITY SERVICE AssoCIATIONS (1972).
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planners and architects involved in the project and rely heavily
on their advice concerning the use or design features to be cov-
ered. Ordinarily, it is a good idea to create an architectural re-
view committee within the association to administer the protec-
tive covenants. The committee can serve as an important buffer
against the dissension that can easily result when there is a dis-
pute that involves matters of taste. Unless the developer is cer-
tain that he can control the committee, the draftsman should
take care to exempt original construction by the developer
from the architectural review. The term "developer" should be
defined to include the name of the individual or company and
any person or corporation to whom the named developer as-
signs his rights in writing.
b. Covenants for Maintenance Assessments
Unlike restrictive covenants, covenants for maintenance as-
sessment call upon the landowner to do something affirmative
-to pay money. Unfortunately, the law that relates to affirma-
tive covenants presents the ordinary mortal with one of the most
confounding intellectual experiences he can suffer. There seem
to be two schools of thought in this field: one follows the mys-
teries of "privity" and "touching and concerning" through
every turn only to confound itself and its readers; the other
simply tells us that all of this knowledge is irrelevant because af-
firmative covenants will always run as equitable servitudes in
equity.2 7 Most of the writings in the latter group imply that
equity will enforce the obligations by some form of personal
judgment-and that is simply untrue.28 But I am tired of en-
27 For an informative review of the existing theories and cases, see 5 R. POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY 670-86, at 139-344.9 (1971). Other recent writings include, C. CLARK, REAL
COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" (2d ed. 1947); Berger, A
Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1971); New-
man and Losey, Covenants Running with the Land, and Equitable Servitudes: Two Concepts,
or One?, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1319 (1970). Compare Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of
Land, 8 J. LAW & ECON. 133 (1965), with HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 309-37.
28 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.36 (A. Casner ed. 1952), explicitly states that
affirmative covenants will run with the land as equitable servitudes and will be enforced
by mandatory injunction. I have not been able to find a single case which supports that
last proposition. Of the two cases cited, the first, Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.
1925), expressly refused to reach the question, and the second, Whittenton Mfg. Co. v.
Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E.441 (1895), expressly limited the judgment so that execu-
tion could issue only against the land in question, id. at 331, 41 N.E. at 446. For other
cases, see J. KRASNOWIECKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OWNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT OF
LAND 408-11 (1965); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 315-20.
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gaging in fruitless polemics and so, I am sure, are my readers.
So I am going to state what I think the rules are, and why:
Rule 1. Courts do not like to enforce affirmative obligations
against successors in interest to real property-an affirmative
covenant will not run-unless they are satisfied that (a) assum-
ing each successor knew of the covenant,29 he would naturally
expect to be bound when taking title to the property, and (b) the
nature of the covenant is such that the purchaser can generally
predict what the burden will be at the time of his purchase (en-
abling him to adjust the purchase price up or down for its pres-
ence).
The first part of this proposition-the purchaser must ex-
pect to be bound-is really what the courts are concerned with
when they talk about whether the covenant "touches and con-
cerns the land." The covenant must relate to the land in such a
way that the ordinary mortal would expect that if he takes the
land, the covenant will come with it.30 That is why a covenant to
fly to the moon will not run with the land.31 But a covenant to
pay for the maintenance of common areas and facilities will
run32 - if the other rules I am about to discuss are also met.
29 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 680 (1971).
30 Professor Bigelow suggested some years ago that a covenant "touches and con-
cerns the land" whenever the defendant's legal interest in the land will become less val-
uable through its enforcement. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L.
REv. 639, 646 (1914). Most commentators agree with Professor Bigelow's suggestion, see,
e.g., 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 675 (1971). But to apply that theory, one must be
able to identify what is part of the bundle that is called one's "legal interest in the land."
These writers have not furnished us with any satisfactory method of doing this. I think
that the best way of identifying the contents is to examine the reasonable expectation of
most buyers. Similarly, with respect to the running of the benefit of a covenant, Professor
Bigelow used the same formula-in his view the covenant would "touch and concern"
the benefited land if the plaintiff's legal interest in the land would become more valuable
through its enforcement. One is presented with the same problems of identification here
as well.
Professor Bigelow did not, however, address himself to the question whether a cove-
nant which "touches and concerns" a defendant's land can run even though it does not
touch and concern plaintiff's land (because the latter has no land), and vice versa. See
note 43 infra.
31 Unfortunately, I cannot find a case that involves these facts, but cases that say
that the covenant to pay taxes runs, Post v. Kearney, 2 N.Y. 394 (1849), or that the cove-
nant to maintain insurance runs, Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio 340 (1859), really can-
not be explained unless one is prepared to admit that the expectations of "reasonable"
persons is not as elusive a principle as most real property experts think. Indeed, basic
theory of the law of torts and of contracts relies, in large measure, on this principle.
32 Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938), is the leading case. See Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679,
103 So. 2d 418 (1958); Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d 565,
295 P.2d 714 (1956); Phillips v. Smith, 240 Iowa 863, 38 N.W.2d 87 (1949); Queen City
Park Ass'n v. Gale, 110 Vt. 110, 3 A.2d 529 (1939). See also notes 35-38 infra.
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The above rule of normal expectation also serves to explain
why a subsequent taker is bound by a covenant when he takes
the same interest as the original covenantor, but is not if he takes
a lesser interest.3 3 If the rule were otherwise, a tenant would au-
tomatically be bound by the covenants of his landlord-hardly
a normal expectation. Similarly, it is clear that a mortgage lend-
er is not obligated on an assessment covenant until he takes pos-
session of the property upon default. Indeed most jurisdictions
hold that he is not obligated until he has acquired title through
foreclosure or through some similar proceeding.34 That result
is hard to explain in a "title" theory jurisdiction (where the mort-
gage lender takes title to the property on the date when the
mortgage is given). But it is not hard to explain under my rule.
An ordinarily prudent businessman would not expect to be per-
sonally liable on covenants affecting the mortgaged real proper-
ty until he takes over control of that property. Until such time
he thinks of himself only as a secured interest holder and not
as an owner, no matter what the legal doctrines say.
The second part of the above proposition (that the burden
of the covenant must be generally predictable) is best illustrated
by the cases that have frowned upon c'ovenants which require
an owner to supply steam heat to a neighboring property per-
petually. 35 There is no way one can confidently predict the
burden of such a covenant over an indefinite period.
33 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.15 (A. Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 535 (1944).
34 Sources cited note 33 supra; see cases collected in Amco Trust, Inc. v. Naylor, 159
Tex. 146, 317 S.W.2d 47 (1958). The case states, incorrectly, that in "title" theory juris-
dictions, the mortgagee is bound even before he takes possession, citing Williams v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934). Williams, however, clearly holds
that the mortgagee is not obligated on the covenant when the possession of the mort-
gaged premises is left with the mortgagor.
35 See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). Some believe that
Miller was, in effect, overruled by Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d
240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959) (involving a suit in damages covering a short period during
which defendant had stopped supplying steam heat to plaintiff's property just prior to
the sale and conveyance that terminated the covenant forever). But if my theory is cor-
rect, Nicholson would never have been decided favorably to the plaintiff had the plaintiff
not sold his benefited land to the defendant, thus terminating all future enforcement.
When most commentators expressed the view that Furness v. Sinquett, 60 N-J. Super.
410, 159 A.2d 455 (1960), closed off all possibilities of affirmative covenants running in
New Jersey, it seemed to me that the case merely stood for the proposition that a covenant
cannot be enforced when its enforcement was not expected by the purchaser. Furness
involved events that happened in 1893 when every purchaser bought a lot in a subdivision
and covenanted "to construct a sidewalk" on his lot. The covenant was never enforced
until 1960 when someone in the subdivision decided that it would be nice to have side-
walks. The case should have been decided against enforcement because it is clear that.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:711
Applying these two rules to the maintenance assessment, it
is clear that the assessment will run with the land, provided the
formula for the assessment is such that its burden is generally
predictable. That is why I have counselled that the covenant
should establish definite maximums for the assessment with a
carefully designed procedure for increasing this maximum.
36 I
do not think that a formula which simply says that the home
purchaser must pay "his pro-rata share" of the assessments will
suffice, especially where the number of units sharing in the ex-
pense is not determined.
Rule 2. When several landowners expect to share equally in
the benefits and burdens of a covenant and that expectation is
disappointed, so that some have the benefits but not the bur-
dens whereas others have to carry an extra burden, the courts
are apt to find that the covenants are not enforceable, 37 at least
if the majority of those who have the unexpected burdens so
desire.
An example of this rule is suggested by Peterson v. Beekmere,
Inc.38 In this case, although all of the lots were entitled to the
use and benefit of a lake, only some of the lots were subject to
assessment. Those who were burdened by the assessment suc-
cessfully brought an action to have it declared unenforceable.
It is sad that the court felt compelled to distinguish, synthesize
and blend all of the separate doctrines of covenant law to reach
this perfectly sensible conclusion, 39 but that has been the tradi-
tion in this field of the law.
purchasers could not have suspected that the sidewalks would be built 67 years after it
would have made sense. Instead, the court held that affirmative covenants do not run
with the land in New Jersey. I knew that view was not going to prevail for long, and it
did not. See note 38 infra.
36 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 201-08, 326-27.
37 Note that I have changed the formulation of this rule. Instead of saying that the
covenant will not run with the land, I say that the covenant is unenforceable. It is gen-
erally believed that the doctrines that control the running of covenants with the land
have nothing to say about enforcement between the original contracting parties. I believe,
on the other hand, that if these doctrines are worth anything, they represent policies
designed to prevent overreaching in real estate transactions and are equally applicable
to the original contracting parties. For a broader discussion of this point, see note 39
infra.
38 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (1971).
3. The court had considerable difficulty overcoming the prior holding in Furness
v. Sinquett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (1960), to the effect that affirmative cove-
nants will not run in New Jersey. It did so, essentially, by reference to changing times
concluding that today there should be no difference between affirmative and restric-
tive covenants. It then grafted the doctrine of the "common scheme" from the restric-
720
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In any event, the case supports the advice given in the Homes
Association Handbook that the obligation to pay the assessment
should be imposed against all of the residential lots in the sub-
division, including the lots that the developer retains unsold.
40
The Handbook points out that the developer can control his ex-
posure by limiting the number of lots platted of record at any
one time.
41
Rule 3. A covenant will not run with an interest in land
unless the person seeking to enforce it has another interest in
the same or in nearby land which is intended to be benefited
by the covenant. By "intended to be benefited" what is meant
is that the giver of the covenant must have reasonably expected
that the right to enforce the covenant would extend to the own-
er of the interest in question. An association can act in a repre-
sentative capacity to enforce a covenant on behalf of members
who have that requisite interest.
42
It has been the practice of some academic writers to deride
this rule. 43 I fail to understand the force of this criticism. The
rule ensures that covenants will not run to protect the idiosyn-
cratic desires of a former owner (a covenant, for example, that
the present owner erect a monument to the Emperor Nero), or
to confer a windfall on a former owner (when the covenant
acquires an unexpected nuisance or "hold-out" value due to
tive covenant field onto affirmative covenants and held that the assessments were un-
enforceable in the absence of uniform application. Unfortunately, the law of restrictive
covenants was not clear on this point either-failure of a common scheme will terminate
enforcement between the lot owners inter se, but there is no case that holds that the cove-
nant becomes unenforceable as between the original parties. For dictum to the contrary,
see Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 232 S.C. 148, 101 S.E.2d 250 (1957). For a collection of
other cases, see HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 310-13.
40 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 203-04.
41 The efficacy of this advice depends, of course, on whether the courts will continue
to draw the line at the recorded plan when determining what expectations of the lot pur-
chasers are entitled to recognition. That question will be considered in Part II of this
article dealing with phased development. See text accompanying note 97 infra. We need
not reach it here because we have assumed a single phase project where one record plan
will be filed for the whole project.
42 See Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
43 See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 27, at 110. Nevertheless, I have not been able to find
more than two cases where a covenant was enforced at the instance of a plaintiff who
had no benefited land. See Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955); Van
Sant v. Rose, 260 I11. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). There are, on the other hand, many cases
that have refused to enforce covenants on the grounds that the plaintiff has no benefited
land. See, e.g., Los Angeles Univ. v. Swarth, 107 F. 798 (9th Cir. 1901); Forman v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911); Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J. Super.
464, 233 A.2d 385 (1967).
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change in circumstances.) 44
Under this rule, a homes association would have no trouble
qualifying. If it owns or leases the facilities supported by the as-
sessments, it clearly has the requisite interest in the benefited
land. Even when it has no interest in the facilities, if its mem-
bers have such an interest (for example, a tenancy in common
or easement rights in the facilities) the association will qualify in
a representative capacity.
45
Indeed, I believe that purchasers in a residential develop-
ment who agree to.pay assessments do not intend to benefit the
association as such but rather intend to benefit each other.
Therefore, the real test is whether the members, not the associa-
tion, have the requisite interests in the common areas and fa-
cilities.
There are two parts to the rule I have stated. First, the per-
son seeking to enforce the covenant must have a propertyP'in-
terest that is benefited. Second, the person making the covenant
must have reasonably expected that the right to enforce would
extend to the owner of the interest in question. If the test is
whether the association has the requisite characteristics, it will
satisfy both tests when it obtains a property interest in the com-
mon areas and facilities and when it is expressly mentioned in
the covenants. But if the characteristics of the members are im-
portant, the association will lose its right to enforce the cove-
nants whenever, (a) its members do not have a sufficient proper-
ty interest in the common areas and facilities, or (b) the mem-
bership expands to include a significant number of persons
who were not expected to have the right to enforce the cove-
nant. I believe that the characteristics of the members are the
important consideration and that a court faced with situation (a)
or (b)46 will be inclined to deny enforcement.
47
44 I would have preferred a rule which required the enforcer to show a "legitimate
economic interest" (rather than limiting the interest to land). Such a reformation would
present, however, the problem of determining which interests are legitimate. See Pratte
v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955) (holding that the plaintiff had an urgent
economic interest-to avoid competition in his trade). Who is to say, however, whether
this is a "legitimate" interest and, if so, under what circumstances? While it is true that
shopping center exclusives have generally been approved, some courts have resisted
the notion that such covenants should run. Compare Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette &
Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 227 N.E.2d 509 (1967), with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous-
ing Authority, 306 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 1974).
1.5 See note 42 supra.
46 Situation (b) is especially significant in a phased development where new sections
and new members are added to the association.
17 I have consistently argued that the right of the association to enforce covenants
rests on the reciprocal right vesting in its members. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 310-1 1,
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I feel diffident about stating the next rule, my last, be-
cause it is so obvious that it appears banal. Yet a higher court in
Maryland recently wandered far afield to find a rationale for
its decision when this one was so obviously available:
Rule 4. A covenant that requires a homebuyer to pay for
the cost of recreational areas, or of certain common facilities,
will not be enforced if the circumstances show that the cost has
already been capitalized into the price of the home. In other
words, courts do not like arrangements in which the housing
consumer may be misled into paying for something twice.
In Sanitary Facilities II, Inc. v. Blum,48 a developer conveyed
all of the land planned for a residential community to Sanitary
Facilities II, Inc., a sister corporation.. Sanitary reconveyed to
the developer. In the deed of reconveyance, Sanitary cove-
nanted to construct certain water and sewer facilities on the site
and the developer convenanted that all of the lots created with-
in the property would be subject to an annual assessment in
favor of Sanitary in an amount sufficient to retire the capital
cost of the facilities over thirty years. The assessments were to
"commence on January 1 of the second year following convey-
ance by the Developer[,] its successors or assigns as to each lot
conveyed for the construction of a dwelling unit thereon ....49
The developer then sold and conveyed the entire property to
Levitt and Sons, Inc. The agreement between the original de-
veloper and Levitt apparently required Levitt to pay the entire
principal cost of the sewer and water facilities to Sanitary and
Sanitary to release the covenants. Although Levitt paid Sanitary,
for reasons which are totally obscure the covenants were not
released. Levitt then sold all of the lots to home purchasers with
record notice of the covenants. Sanitary subsequently claimed
the right to collect the assessments.
333-35; cf. Wald v. West MacGregor Protective Ass'n, 332 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App. 1960).
There is strong support for the proposition that reciprocal enforcement rights can
exist only between lot owners who could have anticipated that they would be mutually
joined under one scheme. See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224
(1935); Rodgers v. Reimann, 227 Ore. 62, 361 P.2d 101 (1961).
In addition, situations (a) & (b) suggest an answer to the often raised question
whether it is possible to combine a discretionary membership association (where mem-
bership is extended only at the discretion of a membership committee) with a manda-
tory assessment against those members who are admitted. If I am right, the answer is
no. The residents must have a permanent, alienable, and quantifiable property interest
in the common areas and facilities to support a mandatory assessment. Since the size
of a discretionary membership is never entirely predictable, the quality of the interest
obtained cannot be readily determined. Cf text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
48 22 Md. App. 90, 322 A.2d 228 (1974).
49 322 A.2d at 236.
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This case could have been disposed of on a number of
theories. The lower court, for example, held that the developer
had agreed to release the covenant if Sanitary was paid and that
Sanitary was bound by the developer's agreement because it
was a sister corporation. The matter also could have been re-
solved under Rule No. 350 because Sanitary had no further in-
terest in any land. I think it should have been disposed of under
Rule No. 4, because it was a clear case of gouging. The higher
court held, instead, that the covenant did not run because the
assessment was to commence in the future. That position is
simply untenable 51 and is a good example of what happens
when a field of law suffers from an intellectual rigor mortis.
In light of the experience which supports Rule No. 4, I
would recommend strongly that developers not plan on recover-
ing the capital cost of any improvement through long term as-
sessment against the residents. Whether this be done through a
loan to the association secured by a mortgage on the common
areas and facilities, or by leasing the common areas and facilities
to the association, 52 the dangers of double recovery and goug-
ing are such that if the courts do not invalidate these arrange-
ments, the legislatures will.
53
c. Party Wall Covenants
The Homes Association Handbook notes that the rules of law
applicable to party walls in general do not solve a number of
problems that may arise between adjacent unit owners. It there-
fore urges that such matters as the obligation to maintain and
repair and the right to construct be expressly covered by cove-
nants in the Declaration. 54 Most of these suggestions are based
50 See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
"' Most commentators have agreed that the distinction between things "in esse" and
things not "in esse" mentioned in Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583),
went out with the spats. 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 673 (1971). Most homes associa-
tion covenants provide that assessments will not begin until the first month following
the date when the common areas and facilities are conveyed to the association. Indeed,
that is the approach taken in article IV, § 7 of the model Declaration of Covenants, Con-
ditions and Restrictions published by HUD. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOP-
MIENT, LAND PLANNING PROCEDURES AND DATA FOR INSURANCE FOR HOME MORTGAGE PRO-
GRAMS App. 2, at 5 (Handbook No. 4140.2, 1973). Would the court in Sanitary Facilities
wish to conclude that such homes association assessments are not enforceable in Mary-
land? I think not.
52 For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 75-90 infra.
-1 For an extended analysis of how the courts' reluctance to act has resulted in leg-
islative activism in the condominium area, see Comment, supra note 3.
54 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 329-3 1.
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on the assumption that no one has an affirmative obligation to
rebuild if any unit is destroyed by fire or other casualty. Thus,
for example, the suggestion that the owner whose unit is de-
stroyed must weatherproof the exposed party wall assumes that
he may decide not to rebuild his unit. I am convinced that this
is not a desirable situation. Developers of fee ownership town-
house projects should, by covenant and other arrangements,
establish a proper insurance and replacement scheme, similar
to the schemes required by statute in condominiums. I made
this point in my prior article. 55 Now I should explain the me-
chanics in greater detail.
B. A Replacement and Insurance Scheme for
Townhouse Development
1. The Need for Community-Wide Decisionmaking
The general practice in fee ownership townhouse develop-
ments has been to sell and convey the townhouse like a single
family detached home. The purchaser has no obligation to re-
build his unit in case of fire or other casualty loss. He is ex-
pected to obtain individual insurance. The standard home-
owner policy provides that if a unit is destroyed the insurer may
either replace the unit or pay the proceeds over to the owner.
5 6
The insured then has the option to rebuild. If there is a mort-
gage, the mortgagee will require that the insurance policy be
endorsed to him. The endorsement does not waive the insur-
ance company's right to rebuild, but if the company elects not
to do so the proceeds will become payable to the mortgagee to
the extent of its interest. 57 The mortgagee, in turn, reserves the
right to apply the proceeds to the balance of the loan outstand-
ing at the time of the loss or to make them available to the own-
er for reconstruction, at its election. This reservation appears
in all home mortgage instruments.
Thus, in effect, the decision whether to rebuild the unit
will be made in a hierarchical fashion first by the insurance com-
pany, then by the mortgage lender, and finally by the owner. In
an inflationary era, the insurance company will usually not
choose to rebuild. Similarly, the mortgage lender may decide to
'See Krasnowiecki, supra note 1, at 351-53.
'6 See N.Y. Ins. Information Inst., Sample Ins. Policies Form No. 49, Standard Fire
Policy, line 141 (std. ed. 1968).
5 Id. Broad Form HO-2, Homeowner's Policy Additional Conditions 4 (1970).
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terminate its exposure by applying the proceeds to the balance
of the loan-especially if it has no mortgages outstanding on
the adjacent units. It seems to me that this is a very poor ar-
rangement. It exposes all unit purchasers and their lenders to
the possibility that they will end up with a unit in or next to a
townhouse building that looks like a toothless monster.
In addition, under the present arrangement unit owners
are exposed to unnecessary liability. Obviously, when units are
attached, as they are in the townhouse design, it is possible that
a negligently caused fire in one unit may damage or destroy
several other units. If each unit is separately insured by its own-
er, as it is under the conventional system, the insurance com-
panies holding policies on the damaged units will have an action
over against the negligent owner. A typical homeowner's policy
provides only negligible coverage for this kind of liability.
I therefore urge that developers of fee ownership town-
house projects establish, by covenant, a replacement and in-
surance scheme similar to those available in the condominium.
Indeed, the arrangement established by covenant can be su-
perior to the arrangement that is dictated by the condominium
statutes, since those are often ill designed to solve the problems
of a townhouse development.
2. The Covenant to Rebuild
As in the condominium, the covenants should place the
obligation to rebuild the units on the homes association rather
than on each individual owner and the association should be re-
quired to carry a blanket insurance policy in an amount suf-
ficient to cover one hundred percent of the cost of replacement.
The insurance arrangement should mirror the arrangement
recommended for the condominium. 58 The blanket policy
should waive the company's subrogation rights against other
unit owners and those who reside with them, relinquish the oth-
er-insurance clause, and modify the pro-rata clause so that suf-
ficient proceeds will be immediately available to the association
for rebuilding even if unit owners carry other insurance. The
policy should also modify the increased hazard clause so that
8 For an excellent summary of the condominium insurance arrangement, see
Takabuki, Condominiun Insurance: A Case History, in PROCEEDINGS, ABA INSURANCE,
NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION LAW SECTION 206 (1967).
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only those special risks that are within the association's exclusive
control are material. The insurance proceeds should be made
payable to an insurance trustee, and mortgage lenders should
be required to modify the provisions reserving to the mortgagee
the right to apply the proceeds of the blanket policy to the bal-
ance of the loan. I would additionally recommend that this pro-
vision be included in the covenants so that second and subse-
quent generation mortgages will likewise be suitably limited.
59
a. Will These Covenants Run?
I think they obviously will. A simplistic way of looking at
the covenant to rebuild would be to say that the burden of it is
on the association and the benefit is with the townhouse unit
owners and their mortgagees. There is never any problem with
the running of the benefit of an affirmative covenant. But, as I
have said earlier, the benefits and burdens that I think are ma-
terial in the homes association context are those that exist be-
tween the unit owners.60 For those townhouse unit owners (and
their mortgagees) whose units are damaged or destroyed, the
covenant may be considered a burden in the sense that it fore-
closes the alternative of doing nothing; for those whose units
remain, the covenant may be considered a benefit in the sense
that rebuilding will serve to protect the value of their interest.
Since no one can predict whose unit will go and whose will be
spared, the benefits and burdens are entirely reciprocal. That
is always the ideal situation so far as running of covenants is con-
cerned.
Furthermore, the covenant to rebuild and to maintain the
insurance necessary to fund such rebuilding meets all of the
four rules that I have stated earlier. First, one who buys a house
would surely expect to be bound by a covenant which requires
the owner to rebuild the unit, either directly or through the as-
sociation, and to maintain insurance for this purpose-Rule
1(a). 61 The burden of the covenant is readily predictable,
whether it is considered to rest in the payment of the insurance
premiums or in the owner's forfeiture of the right to pocket the
proceeds in lieu of rebuilding-Rule 1(b).62 Rule 2 will be met if
5. A recorded covenant limiting future mortgages will run with the land. Coast
Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
60 See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
61 See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
6 2
Id.
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all of the townhouse owners in the development are required to
participate in the scheme without exception.63 The unit owners,
the potential plaintiffs in any attempt to enforce the covenant,
clearly have an interest in land that was intended to be benefited
-Rule 3.64 The covenant does not involve double recovery-
Rule 4.65 What is true of the unit owners is also true of their
mortgage lenders.
b. When Should the Duty to Rebuild Terminate?
One of the advantages of the homes association approach
is that it leaves one free to rethink this question instead of being
forced to follow a pattern established by statute as is the case in
condominiums. It has often been noted that the condominium
statutes of most jurisdictions are based on an FHA model which
assumed that it was dealing with a single building. Some of the
state statutes were modified slightly to recognize that a condo-
minium may consist of several buildings. On the whole, how-
ever, the solution for the casualty loss problem that is proposed
in those modified statutes is less desirable than the solution that
obtains under the original model.
The condominium statutes that assume a single building
usually provide that the obligation to rebuild terminates if there
is a substantial destruction of "the building" and if seventy-five
percent of the unit owners vote not to rebuild.6 6 In an effort to
recognize condominiums involving several buildings a number
of states provide that the obligation to rebuild terminates when
there is substantial destruction of "one or more of several build-
ings" or if seventy-five percent of the unit owners "directly af-
fected" by the damage or destruction vote not to rebuild. 67 Su-
perficially, this seems like a good solution. But it loses most if
not all of its sense when one realizes that, according to these stat-
utory provisions, the events which result in a termination of
the duty to rebuild also result in a termination of the condomin-
ium regime as to the buildings involved. These statutes go on to
say that the unit owners affected can partition out their portion
" See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
64 See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
6' See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.66See, e.g., CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 47-84 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 584 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-cc (McKinney 1968).
6 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-24(b) (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.
802 (1965).
TOWNHOUSES WITH HOMES ASSOCIATIONS
of the property. If the buildings are grouped around extensive
common areas and recreational facilities, how can a court ra-
tionally separate the interests of those unit owners whose build-
ing was destroyed from the rest of the condominium? The idea
is nonsensical.
Paradoxically, the condominium statutes that assume a
single building provide a better solution precisely because the
several buildings must be treated as one. "Substantial destruc-
tion" then is measured by looking at all of the buildings in the
aggregate. Moreover, it takes seventy-five percent of all of the
unit owners in the entire project to vote for a termination,
which is certainly better than allowing a few owners to do it.
The homes association approach, by way of contrast, avoids
one of the basic elements of the condominium tangle. The de-
cision whether to rebuild any particular units can be divorced
from the decision whether the homes association arrangement
should continue to apply to and bind all of the lots. My own
feeling is that units should always be rebuilt unless a substantial
majority of all of the townhouse owners in the association vote
against it. I would also require a substantial majority of those
whose units were damaged and destroyed, as well as a substan-
tial majority of all of the other owners, to terminate the duty to
rebuild. A termination of the duty to rebuild, however, should
not extinguish the underlying homes association arrangement.
C. The Zoning Question
Zoning has been a hurdle for fee simple townhouse devel-
opment, much more so than for the condominium. The courts
have held that a zoning ordinance cannot exclude condomin-
iums from an apartment district if the units meet the use and
other physical requirements of the district.68 These cases rest
on the proposition that the power to zone is confined to matters
of land use (including physical improvements on the land) and
that the form of ownership is not within that power. I agree, of
course, that condominiums cannot be excluded from apartment
districts. But the statement that matters of title are not within
the land use control power is misleading. Obviously, matters of
68 Maplewood Village Tenants Ass'n v. Maplewood Village, 116 N.J. Super. 372,
282 A.2d 428 (Ch. 1971); Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super.
219, 273 A.2d 397 (App. Div. 1971); Borough of Brookhaven v. Iacobucci, 61 Del. County
628 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
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title are subject to control if they have a direct bearing on land
use. Subdivision control was invented because local authorities
realized that when a parcel is divided among a number of in-
dividual owners, certain land use matters are irrevocably com-
promised: namely access, minimum area requirements, and the
location of buildings in relation to each other.
The division of a larger site into smaller parcels involves
both short range and long range zoning interests of the com-
munity. The short range concern is to secure the proper im-
provement of the site as a whole and a proper disposition of the
buildings upon it. But the land use concern does not stop at
original construction; the possibility of destruction and recon-
struction or renewal must be considered. Furthermore, con-
tinued maintenance, if not of the buildings themselves then of
the common areas, is also a legitimate land use concern and
within the land use control power. On both scores, however, the
condominium cannot be legitimately distinguished from the
rental apartment.
Although the title to the units is divided, the land itself re-
mains under undivided ownership. As a result, both the original
development and any future renewal or redevelopment of the
site remains under unified sponsorship and control. In fact,
the original development of a condominium is normally in the
hands of a single developer. The division of title does not oc-
cur until the buildings are completed. Indeed, the definition of
"unit" in some statutes presupposes completed construction. 69
Even if the applicable statute permits the sale of unimproved
land in condominium units, no improvements can be made un-
less the unit owners act in unison through the central condo-
minium organization. Similarly, if the original improvements
are destroyed, reconstruction must be undertaken in unison
unless the regime is terminated and there is a partition of the
land. Partition, ordinarily, will result in the sale of the site as a
whole. In the unlikely event that partition in kind (into separate
lots) is decreed, this will trigger whatever site planning and sub-
division controls are then applicable. 70 In other words, by per-
69 But see Comment, supra note 3, at 660.
70 New Jersey appears to be the only state which expressly exempts "divisions of
property upon court order" from the reach of its subdivision control law. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55-1.2 (Supp. 1974). It is ironic that that state was also the first to hold that condo-
miniums are not subdivisions.
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mitting division of the buildings into condominium units, the
local government does not compromise its future ability to ap-
ply proper site planning measures to the site as a whole. In all
these respects, therefore, the condominium has characteristics
that are no different from those of a rental apartment. Nor is
there any difference in capacity to maintain the common areas.
Indeed, the condominium is superior because its central man-
agement has a statutory duty to provide proper maintenance
for its common elements, whereas the management of a rental
apartment does not.
The above analysis shows why conventional townhouse de-
velopments that involve individual lots cannot qualify under
the typical apartment district regulations as readily as the con-
dominium. Although the original development and improve-
ment of the site is usually in the hands of a single developer, the
fact that each purchaser acquires his own individual lot in fee
affects the long range interests of the local government con-
cerning proper maintenance and proper re-use of the site in the
event of destruction. The standard apartment district regula-
tions do not address themselves to these concerns because they
assume that the site will remain in undivided ownership. The
answer to the above concerns, however, is not to banish the fee
ownership townhouse from the community, 71 but rather to
draft an ordinance that answers these concerns-one that re-
quires the developer to establish a satisfactory organization for
the maintenance of the common areas, and provides that after
division of the land into lots, the original project area will con-
tinue to be treated as a unit for land use control purposes.
Furthermore, if my recommendations for an insurance
and replacement scheme are followed, 72 the fee ownership
townhouse project can be made more desirable from a land use
point of view than a condominium. As already noted, many
condominium statutes terminate the duty to rebuild and allow
for partition as soon as one building is destroyed. 73 The cove-
nants in a fee ownership townhouse development can provide
for a much more desirable solution.
71 Two recent cases have suggested by implication that townships cannot exclude fee
ownership townhouse developments from every portion of the township. Ellick v. Board
of Supervisors, No. 201 C.D. 1974 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct., Feb. 11, 1975); Camp Hill
Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commonwealth 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974).
72 See text accompanying notes 56-67 supra.
73 See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
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II. DEVELOPMENT By PHASES: THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT
It is clear that the purpose of development by phases is to
avoid irrevocable commitment to a particular plan of develop-
ment and premature expenditures on land and improvements.
7
1
Therefore, development by phases often conflicts with the in-
terests of the housing consumer-at least as he perceives them.
A. Premature Commitment and Expenditures on the Common
Areas and Facilities
1. Statement of the Problem
In strict economic profile the capital cost of the common
areas and facilities of most open space community development
is gradually recovered out of the sales proceeds of the units.
Indeed, that is the proper treatment of the cost for federal in-
come tax purposes.
75
Some developers, especially some condominium developers
in Florida, have attempted to recover the capital cost of the
amenities through assessments against the residents. This is
done by leasing the facilities to the association, or by conveying
the facilities to the association subject to a mortgage back to the
developer or to some third party, and requiring the association
to assess the residents either for the payments to principal and
interest on the mortgage or for the rental payments (a portion
of which represents recovery of principal).
In theory, these alternative approaches could benefit the
consumer in two ways. First, the expense of paying for capital
cost of the common land and facilities could be spread over a
longer term than might be possible if the cost were capitalized
into the price of the unit and financed through a regular home
mortgage. Second, this way of financing the common areas and
facilities might result in lower downpayments. These benefits
could follow if the price of the unit were reduced by the present
worth of that portion of association assessments which is applied
to the capital cost of the improvements or return on capital (as
opposed to current operating expenses). Unfortunately, that
has not been the case. Developers have taken advantage of a
market that is not too sophisticated. Some have even gone so
71 See text accompanying notes 15-25 supra.
75 Country Club Estates, Inc., 22 T.C. 1283 (1954); cf. Jordon Perlmutter, 45 T.C. 311
(1965).
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far as to set the rental or mortgage payments very low during
an initial period with massive escalation clauses to follow, thus
confusing the consumer further.
As a result, all arrangements where the common areas and
facilities are leased to the association or are encumbered by a
mortgage have become suspect. In some quarters the suspicion
has approached hysteria, with- the result that sensible solutions
are no longer considered. The principal objections against leas-
ing the common areas and facilities or maintaining them encum-
bered by a mortgage are the fear that the consumer is being
confused into paying for the capital cost of the improvements
several times over, and the danger that the consumer will lose
the enjoyment of the common areas and facilities through for-
feiture of the lease or foreclosure of the mortgage.
I think it is improper to consider the lease and the mort-
gage situation together as if they represented the same evil. In
my opinion, the lease is always objectionable whereas the mort-
gage is not. If the mortgage is not in excess of the cost of the im-
provements, and specifically provides for a retirement of the
principal out of the proceeds of sale of each unit; and further
if the association has no power to assess the unit owners for
mortgage debt service, the possibility that the consumer will be
required to pay for the facilities twice is precluded. The only
remaining problem is the risk of losing the facilities if the de-
veloper fails to sell a sufficient number of units.
2. The HUD-FHA Solution
It is hard to say that HUD has a solution to this problem.
Rather it seems that HUD slowly backed itself into confusion.
Shortly after the publication of the Homes Association Handbook,7 6
the FHA and VA jointly published a set of model homes asso-
ciation documents.77 The FHA-VA forms were practically iden-
tical to the forms prepared for the Handbook. The major dif-
ference was that the Handbook forms allowed the developer to
76 HANDBOOK, supra note 8.
77 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION & VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, SUGGESTED
LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR PLANNED-UNIT DEVELOPMENTS, (1965). The original forms were
revised in Aug., 1968, without significant changes relevant to this discussion. The 1968
revised forms have now been republished in U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVEL-
OPMENT, LAND PLANNING PROCEDURES AND DATA FOR INSURANCE FOR HOME MORTGAGE
PROGRAMS apps. 1-4 (Handbook No. 4140.2, 1973) [hereinafter cited as HUD No.
4140.2].
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mortgage the common areas to cover the cost of related im-
provements and to retain title pending completion and mar-
keting of the homes (subject to a definite obligation to convey
them at a fixed time), whereas the FHA-VA forms required the
developer to convey the "common area" to the homes associa-
tion free and clear of all liens and encumbrances prior to sale
of the first home.7 8 The FHA-VA also required that all proposed
improvements on the "common area" be completed before the
first sale, or that completion be guaranteed by proper bond or
cash escrow.7 9 I criticized this approach at the time because it
seemed to me to be impractical. 80 Developers were unlikely to
find any lenders willing to release the common areas and im-
provements from blanket land acquisition and construction
mortgages without a substantial cash payment. I also thought
that imposing this extra front end expense on open space com-
munity development would only discourage it. I still think that
I was generally right.
The Homes Association Handbook and subsequent ULI publi-
cations have always recommended that developers of larger
projects be allowed to proceed to final record plan approval by
smaller sections and provide clearly in the Declaration that the
developer has no legal commitment to the purchasers to abide
by the general plan applicable to future sections unless and until
those sections are reduced to final record plan and are added to
the scheme of covenants established in the first section. 81
In its Land Planning Bulletin No. 6, originally published in
1963, FHA indicated that it was in agreement with the phasing
concept. 82 The FHA probably thought that the phasing concept
would solve the developer's financial problems. In theory the
developer could limit his front end expenses under the FHA
78 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LAND PLANNING PRINCIPLES FOR
HOME MORTGAGE INSURANCE 4-2 (Handbook No. 4140.1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HUD No. 4140.1]. Oddly enough, the HUD model Declaration of Covenants (FHA
Form 1401, VA Form 26-8201) defines "common area" as "property owned by the As-
sociation." HUD No. 4140.2, supra note 77, app. 2, at 2. It might seem, therefore, that
the developer need convey nothing to the association since nothing is a "common area"
unless conveyed. But, of course, HUD has not found this argument persuasive, or
amusing.
7' HUD No. 4140.1, supra note 78, at 4-3.
80 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 408 (rev. ed. 1966).
81 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 219.
12 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, PLANNED-UNIT DEVELOPMENT WITH A HOMES ASSOCIATION 20-21 (Land Planning
Bull. No. 6, rev. ed. 1973).
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"free and clear" requirement by including only a small portion
of the common area and facilities in the first phase and then
gradually adding the rest as subsequent phases are developed.
The gradual approach, however, does not appeal to the con-
sumer who is generally urnwilling to postpone his enjoyment of
an amenity until it is fully paid for. Developers have found that
the amenities have to go in up front. They have found that
lenders are not prepared to release the amenities from a blanket
land acquisition and construction loan without repayment of the
entire allocable cost. It seems to me that HUD-FHA is putting
its head in the sand if it believes that developers will advance the
necessary cash. Besides, it is not entirely clear to me that the con-
sumer is benefited. I don't really believe that the blanket
lender can walk away with the amenities after he has released
a number of lots. 83 Money advanced by him for the construc-
tion of the common facilities is probably much cheaper than
money advanced by the developer. It seems, therefore, that de-
velopers and consumer advocates (including HUD-FHA) must
search for some intermediate solution to this problem.
3. A Suggested Solution
Large scale developments are usually planned in such a
way that each phase has a certain independent integrity from
an architectural and site planning point of view. Under such a
plan, there will be some common land and some facilities that
are integral to the phase. Integrity, in the sense that it is used
here, would be determined by the location of the land itself (for
example, open spaces immediately surrounding and separating
the buildings) or by the proposed use of the land or facility in
question. Parking designed for use by that group of buildings,
or walkways providing access to and between the buildings
would be an example of the latter. For want of a better word,
I will refer to these as "neighborhood" common areas and fa-
cilities. On the other hand, much of the planned common land
will not be integral to any particular phase but will, either by lo-
cation or by proposed use, have a community-wide orientation.
I will call these "community-wide" facilities.
84
83 For a discussion of whether a lender would be estopped, see Krasnowiecki, supra
note 1, at 333 n.14.
84 I am grateful to Stephen W. Chamberlin, Director of Planning, Leon N. Weiner
& Assoc., Wilmington, Del., for suggesting this distinction.
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I believe that the developer should be required to convey
the neighborhood common areas and facilities to the association
free and clear of all liens prior to sale of the first home in that
neighborhood. I believe that he should be allowed to maintain
a mortgage on the community-wide facilities beyond the point
of the first sale under certain specific conditions. First, the mort-
gage should be given and held by an institutional lender, pref-
erably the same lender who is financing the construction or the
permanent loan on the homes. Since access to these common
elements is an important component of the value of each in-
dividual unit, such an arrangement would dissuade foreclosure
on the facilities when mortgages are held by the same lenders on
the units themselves.
The mortgage should also have an arrangement for pay-
back out of the proceeds of the sale of each dwelling unit. The
possibility of extending the payback schedule by adding new
land and new units to the mortgage coverage should be express-
ly precluded. 85 Furthermore, the payback should be substantial-
ly accelerated-the mortgage should be cleared before all of
the scheduled units are sold. If such an arrangement is not pos-
sible as to advances on construction of the homes, the developer
should arrange for a separate allocation of the mortgage loan
to the common areas and facilities and an accelerated payback
as to that amount, so that the common areas will be released as
early as practicable.
In addition, each sale should be accompanied by a com-
plete release of the mortgage as a lien on the lot or as a personal
obligation of the owner and there should remain no arrange-
ment by which the lien or the personal obligation to pay the
principal of the mortgage could re-attach to the released lot in
the form of association assessments or otherwise.8 6 Finally, the
fact of the mortgage, its amount, and the payback arrangements
should be disclosed to each purchaser before he enters into a
binding agreement of purchase.
If the project is large enough and involves a substantial
number of phases and neighborhoods, the developer should
establish a two-tier system consisting of a central association to
own and operate the community-wide areas and facilities and a
85 See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
86 See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
TOWNHOUSES WITH HOMES ASSOCIATIONS
number of satellite associations, one for each neighborhood. 7
This approach is particularly advisable when the neighborhoods
are distinguished by different housing types or different forms
of ownership--one neighborhood is townhouses, the other is
garden apartments; one is sales and the other is rental. Even if
that is not the case and the development is relatively homo-
geneous, the creation of a central association serves to distin-
guish in the mind of the consumer those facilities which are
"his" (the neighborhood association facilities) and those which
belong to the entire community and depend upon the success of
the project as a whole.
I think it is wrong to conclude, as HUD-FHA has done, that
the developer should never retain the title to any area or fa-
cility that is shown on a record plan and designated a "common
area" in the Declaration of Covenants. 88 Neighborhood areas
and facilities, I have agreed, should be conveyed to the associa-
tion before the first home is sold in the neighborhood in ques-
tion. But I do not agree that all community-wide areas and fa-
cilities should be conveyed immediately.
Certainly, community-wide areas and facilities that are only
projected in some future phase of the project and are not shown
on any record plan or designated in any recorded Declaration
need not be conveyed. Indeed, that is the whole purpose of the
phasing concept. Even those that are shown on a record plan,
however, need not necessarily be conveyed. On the contrary, if
such an area or facility is allowed to remain subject to a mort-
gage, the developer should retain title to it until released from
the mortgage in order to alert the consumer to the fact that the
area or facility is not absolutely secure. If the developer conveyed
the area or facility to the association subject to the mortgage, the
risks of confusion are greater. Consequently, the Homes Associa-
tion Handbook recommends that the developer should be allowed
to retain the legal tite to some of the common areas and fa-
cilities.89 The Handbook forms, however, require that the record
plan and Declaration contain a definite commitment to convey
87 It will be recalled that I also urged the two-tier approach as a solution to the ex-
pandable condominium problem. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 1, at 361-65. The dif-
ference there was that each neighborhood association would be a condominium rather
than a homes association.
88 See note 78 supra & accompanying text.
89 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 239-40.
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when a stated number of the units have been sold, or, in any
event, not later than a stated date. 90
In my conversations with FHA officials at that time, it was
my understanding that FHA did not want to permit such an ar-
rangement because of the fear that intervening bankruptcy of
the developer might make it impossible to enforce the commit-
ment. The Handbook approach, however, envisages that the lot
purchasers would be granted express easements of enjoyment
over the area immediately and that only the bare legal title
would remain with the developer. Those easements might, of
course, be subject to the mortgage (if the mortgagee does not
join in the Declaration) but I fail to see how getting the fee title
places the purchasers in any better position (either as to the
mortgagee or as to the potential bankruptcy of the developer)
than getting the easements, since the easements constitute the
entire enjoyment of the property.91
B. Advance Improvement: Risk of Undermaintenance
and Overloading
When major community-wide facilities are put in up front,
the early purchasers face the risk that the project will fail be-
fore there are enough residents to support the facility. The
HUD-FHA position that all such facilities must be cleared of
debt before the first home is sold really does not solve this prob-
lem. If anything, involvement of a reputable lending institution
suggests that someone other than the developer has assessed
the risks and believes that the market will run strong enough
to retire the debt out of the sales of the units within a reason-
able period of time. But even if the lender's market analysis
proves false, I do not think the lender will take the facilities away
from the existing residents. I do not believe that the courts will
90 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, app. F, art. IV, § 2 (Model Form: Declaration of Cove-
nants and Restrictions) [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
91 I have already noted that I believe. the mortgagee will become subject to the lot
owners' easements by estoppel. Krasnowiecki, supra note 8, at 333 n.14. The commit-
ment to convey the common area in the future might be an "executory contract" which
the developer's trustee in bankruptcy might be entitled to disavow under § 70b of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). But according to the Handbook documents,
the sale and conveyance of each lot and home would include a grant of a perpetual
easement of enjoyment over the common areas shown on the recorded subdivision plan
-a completed "transfer" which the trustee could not set aside unless made "without
fair consideration." II U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1970). This may raise a question when only a
few homes have been sold, but the same question would exist even if the common area
were conveyed in fee.
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permit it.92 The real risks are that the existing residents may be
called upon to contribute substantially more to the maintenance
of the facility than originally expected or that they may be forced
to share the facility with additional and unexpected persons. The
first risk is undermaintenance and the second is overloading.
1. The Risk of Undermaintenance
There is no perfect solution to this problem. I do not think
that a presale requirement would be realistic. The fact is that
the consumer does not want to buy until he has seen the im-
provement. The idea that one can presell four or five year's worth
of individual homes in the suburbs is, therefore, a pipe dream.
Fortunately, current HUD-FHA regulations do not require pre-
sale for homes association developments. 93 I have the following
suggestions.
First, the decision whether to increase assessments to ab-
sorb the slack created by a lag or failure in projected sales must
be made by the existing residents and not by the developer or
by the financial interests behind him. Consequently, provisions
in the covenants which simply obligate the residents to pay a
"pro-rata share of the expenses" of the facilities should be
avoided. The exposure of each home must be limited in some
way. The standard method is to establish a maximum assess-
ment which is subject to increase only by scheduled inflationary
increments or by the vote of a substantial number of the resi-
dent owners. Another possible approach is to provide that each
unit is obligated for its pro-rata share of expenses but not in
excess of a certain percentage of the total set by reference to
the total number of units needed to support the facility.
94
Second, as Rule No. 3 indicates, all record lots should be
subject to assessment, including those retained by the devel-
oper.95 Since the developer can control his exposure by the
number of lots recorded at one time, the question then is wheth-
er there should be some additional commitment to underwrite
deficiencies in the total maintenance budget for a stated num-
',2 See note 83 supra.
"J HUD 4140.1, supra note 78, 4-4.
'4 Because the maximum exposure is not stated in a dollar amount, this latter al-
ternative may open the door to bilking (e.g., through exorbitant management fees) as
well as to misrepresentation (concerning expected maintenance costs). It also tends to
conflict with my Rule No. I for covenants. See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
• See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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ber of years. Developers claim that their own self-interest in see-
ing the project sell is a sufficient commitment. Although I think
that is true of the better developers, I tend to agree with those
who feel that there has to be some way of flushing out the shaky
ones. I do not think that heavy escrow and bond requirements at
the front end are desirable. I would prefer some form of a di-
rect review of the developer's financial structure and his capac-
ity to deliver.
2. Risk of Overloading: Future Additions
When community-wide facilities are committed with the
early phases of a development, the practical opposite of under-
maintenance may result. To salvage a failing project, or to max-
imize profits, the developer may decide to depart from the
existing plan by adding more units than originally projected or
adding units expected to make more intensive use of the com-
mon areas without making any offsetting adjustment in the
amount and location of new facilities. This is the problem of
overloading.
If the rules that I have stated concerning affirmative cove-
nants have any validity, such overloading violates Rules 2.6 and
397 and could terminate the obligation to pay assessments. But
that is not a realistic remedy. The existing residents will per-
ceive that if they cut off the assessments, the condition of the
common areas may deteriorate and result in further losses.
Consequently, they are more likely to seek an injunction to pre-
vent a departure from the original overall plan.
Although, except as to each phase, the overall plan will not
be recorded in the land records, it will be on file with the local
zoning and planning authorities. Moreover, it will probably be
used extensively by the developer's sales force. Few developers
make any effort to prevent or to control the representations
made to the purchaser about the overall plan. There is a good
chance that the courts will extend the doctrine of implied ease-
ments and covenants to hold the developer to such repre-
sentations.9 8
To avoid this result the problem of overloading must be
dealt with explicitly in the Declaration of Covenants and Ease-
96 See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
97 See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
"8 Burgess v. Putnam, 464 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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ments. The Homes Association Handbook suggested that the de-
veloper's right to bring additional land within the scheme of an
existing association should be limited by a "general plan." 99 This
plan was to be prepared independently from any other general
plan for the purpose of establishing the basic ground rules for
additions, such as how many units could be added at the maxi-
mum, how much more open space would be added at a mini-
mum, and so forth. The sole function of the "general plan" was
to control the developer's right to make an addition to an existing
association. The developer, of course, would retain the right to
develop any future phase in a different manner provided he did
not add it to the existing association. The Handbook counselled
that the plan should contain a conspicuous statement to this ef-
fect and should be made part of the package of information
handed to every prospective purchaser.' 00
Most developers are concerned that this approach might
be unduly constraining. The Handbook seemed to require a phys-
ical plan-one that graphically depicts the future phases of the
project and the general disposition of land uses. Since I agree
that that is unduly constraining, I now have the following sug-
gestions.
I have already observed that for the larger project a two-
tier association system-central association for community-wide
facilities coupled with local associations for neighborhood com-
mon areas-makes a lot of sense.'01 I have also urged that the
neighborhood common areas and facilities ought to be com-
pleted and conveyed free and clear to the association from the
start.10 2 But that does not preclude the possibility that the devel-
opment of the housing itself will be undertaken in phases, rec-
ord plans being filed separately for each phase.
If such phasing is planned within a neighborhood associa-
tion, I believe that the developer's right to add the neighbor-
hood phases to each other should be controlled by a physical
plan of the sort recommended in the Handbook. However, the
right to add new phases to the central association should not
be controlled by a physical plan. A physical plan would be un-
duly constraining, considering the period of development that
' Declaration, supra note 90, art. II, § 2.
100 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 218-19.
"' See text accompanying note 84 supra.
102 Id.
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is often involved and the changes that can occur on the market.
A compromise may be a "policies plan" which pins down the
matters that are of legitimate concern to the consumer-for ex-
ample, the maximum number of units that can be added, the
ratio of open space to number of units, and the ratio of square
foot area of various facilities to the number of units. I know
that many developers still believe that the courts will honor an
unrestricted reservation to make additions. But I suspect that
at the first sign of overreaching the courts will clamp down on
the developer, probably restricting him to the original land use
plan. I strongly believe that it is better to meet this problem
face-on with a reasonable solution.
C. Voting Control Over the Association
The Homes Association Handbook proposed that the devel-
oper retain a 3 to 1 voting superiority over the residents until
the total outstanding votes of the residents equal the total out-
standing votes of the developer.' 0 3 Since the votes were based on
the number of lots, the developer would lose control when sev-
enty-five percent had been sold. To prevent the developer from
using his voting control to make changes adverse to the interests
of the residents, the Handbook proposed that the developer votes
be placed in a separate class.' 0 4 This would enable the drafts-
man to specify in the covenants which issues would require the
assent of the majority of both classes and which could be deter-
mined by a simple majority of the entire voting membership. In
this way, some issues could not be decided by either the devel-
oper or the residents alone. On these issues, each class would, in
effect, have a veto power over the proposed action of the other.
The Handbook proposed that critical issues such as increases in
the maximum assessment, 10 5 diversion of any existing common
areas or facilities to some other use,' 0 6 and additions that sub-
stantially depart from the "general plan" should require the as-
sent of both classes of voters.10 7 On the other hand, election of
directors and daily operations would remain subject to the vot-
ing superiority of the developer.1
0 8
113 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 240-41; Declaration, supra note 90, art. III, § 2.
104 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 240-41; Declaration, supra note 90, art. III, § 2.
"' Declaration, supra note 90, art. V, § 5.
106 Id. art. IV, § 3(f).
10- HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 394-95 (Model Forms: Articles of Incorporation, art.
Vi).
100 Id. art. V.
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I hold no brief for the 3 to 1 formula. On the contrary, in
larger projects where a two-tier association system should be em-
ployed, I believe that the developer should be allowed to retain
control over the central association until he completes the en-
tire project. On the other hand, in the neighborhood association
the developer may have less at stake and an earlier relinquish-
ment of control makes some sense. When the developer retains
a controlling vote, the two class voting system is imperative. It
does not matter whether the distinction is expressed in terms of
class A and class B votes'0 9 or in terms of "developer" and
"homeowner" votes."10 If no distinction is made, the developer
retains an overwhelming vote on all issues and may, in his own
self-interest, increase the maximum assessment, absolve his
lots from assessment, or divert the common areas to some
other use."'
Another problem arises if some of the units will be sold and
others will be held for rent. A formula which allows one vote for
each dwelling unit owned may have the undesirable result of
transferring permanent control to one or more landlords with-
in the development. Although such centralization of power can
be avoided in part by placing the rental units in their own sep-
arate neighborhood associations, the problem persists within the
central association which owns the community-wide facilities.
Some commentators have suggested that each dwelling unit
should be given two votes and when a unit is rented the votes
should be split, one to the tenant and one to the landlord." 2 As
previously noted, I do not think this solves the problem." 3 I be-
lieve that the total votes allowed to the rental units should be
adjusted so that they remain substantially less than the votes of
the owner occupants.
D. The Federal Agencies
1. HUD-FHA
HUD has recently reissued most of its prior publications and
model documents relating to homes associations in handbook
109 Declaration, supra note 90, art. III, § 2.
110 See COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT CORP., supra note 26.
11 'The problem of extended control is equally oppressive in the condominium
context. See Comment, supra note 3, at 645-46.
112 See COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT CORP., supra note 26, at 6-7.
"' See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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form. There has been no change in its position."1 4
Thus HUD continues to require that all common areas be
improved and conveyed to the association free and clear of liens
prior to the first sale," 15 without drawing any distinction between
facilities that are an integral part of the neighborhood under de-
velopment and other community-wide facilities. 16 This inflex-
ible approach extends to the other problem areas I have dis-
cussed above, namely the problem of voting control and the
problem of overloading.
HUD has no regulation that specifically addresses the vot-
ing problem. Rather HUD personnel treat the model documents
as law, ignoring the introductory statement that "[t]heir use is
not mandatory but recommended."'"1 7 The model documents
have simply adopted the ULI Handbook three-to-one formula,
and area offices insist on that formula regardless whether
they are dealing with neighborhood associations or a central
association. 1
8
A similar fate has befallen the problem of additions. The
HUD Handbook and its Instructions for the model documents
require that the developer prepare a general plan of the devel-
opment and submit it to the relevant agency within HUD.11"9
114 HUD No. 4140.1,supra note 78; HUD No. 4140.2, supra note 77.
1 See notes 78-79 supra & accompanying text.
116 See text accompanying note 84 supra. A similar lack of sensitivity to the economic
realities of open space community development is exhibited in recently announced regu-
lations of the FNMA and FHLMC governing their participation in conventional condo-
minium and planned unit development home mortgage loans. FNMA's regulations re-
quire that improvements to "the common areas" be completed before any individual
home (or unit) mortgage is submitted for purchase by the Association and that all com-
mon areas must be conveyed to the homeowner's organization free and clear of all liens
prior to that time. FNMA Conventional Selling Contract Supplement, § 502.03, Apr. 24,
1974. "Planned Unit Development" is defined as: "A real estate development which con-
sists of separately owned lots with contiguous or non-contiguous areas or facilities
usually owned by an Owners Association ...." Id. § 105. FHLMC's regulations contain
similar requirements but apply them only to common areas which are "regarded as part
of the value of the unit in a Planned Unit Development for purposes of the appraisal
upon which the mortgage loan is predicated." FHLM Sellers' Guide to Conventional
Whole Loans, § 2.204H, July 1, 1974. This modification is of interest because HUD has
generally proved unwilling to trust its appraisal process to make a proper adjustment
for incomplete common areas rather than require completion. The degree of a con-
sumer's disappointment over losing promised amenities is not necessarily related to
whether he has paid for them. HUD may simply be responding to the political realities
of its job.
I17 HUD No. 4140.2, supra note 77, app. 1, at 1.
118 Memorandum from HUD Regional Office III, June 10, 1974, reviewing docu-
mentation for a large-scale project located in the Philadelphia area, on file with the
author.
119 HUD No. 4140.2, supra note 77, app. 1, at 3.
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There is no requirement that the plan be communicated to the
consumer in some way. This is fortunate, because the plan is the
old physical plan of the ULI Handbook, which is much too con-
straining when used to control additions to a community-wide
association. However, HUD itself may hold the developer to
the strictures of that plan. The model documents expressly
grant that power to HUD.'
I am convinced that these inflexible policies will do a great
deal of harm to the planned unit development movement, if
they have not done so already. At best, they will drive developers
of open space housing away from the HUD programs, thus neu-
tralizing any influence which HUD may have had in establishing
better practices in this field.
2. OILSR
Since I wrote the comparison of condominiums and homes
associations,1 2 ' the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration
has entered this field. The OILSR has recently revised its regu-
lations under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act122 to
provide that sales of "lots" include sales of condominium
"units."1 23 This change did not present any new problems for
homes association developments since these always involved lots
in the conventional sense. However, the condominium industry
was so outraged by the expansion of the conventional meaning
of the word "lot," that it failed to address itself to the real prob-
lem. In my opinion, there was nothing wrong with the OILSR's
view that condominium units are "lots" within the meaning of
the Act. What was wrong was the confusion which appears to
prevail in that agency concerning the scope and meaning of the
120 Although HUD does not appear to require that the plan be communicated to
the consumer directly, the documents do contain an anomalous provision which requires
the developer to provide the consumer with the deed description of the parcels that may
be added. Id. 6 (Form No. 5). This is nonsense. It does nothing for the consumer and as-
sumes that the developer already has a legal or equitable interest in the proposed addi-
tion, elevating this assumption into a requirement. When applied to a small project or to
a phase of a larger project, I have no objection to the requirement that the developer
have control over the land area involved, but it makes little sense to apply the require-
ment to all of the land area that may ultimately be included in a larger development.
That is why I now feel that a better way to protect the interests of the consumer is to
require that the developer establish a policies plan that would focus primarily on the
common areas and facilities.
121 Krasnowiecki, supra note 1.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
123 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1(h) (1974). For an extended discussion of this new activism,
see Comment, supra note 3, at 658-62.
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"homebuilder exemption" in the Interstate Land Sales Act. The
exemption states that the Act does not apply to "the sale or lease
of any improved land on which there is a residential, commercial,
or industrial building, or to the sale or lease of land under a con-
tract obligating the seller to erect such a building thereon within
a period of two years."
' 124
The primary purpose of the Act was to control fraudulent
offerings of unimproved lots or parcels of ground. I believe
that the purpose of the second clause was to prevent subdividers
from avoiding the thrust of the Act by luring the consumer into
a binding agreement to purchase the lot through some wholly
unenforceable promise to build a home on it. I believe that the
Act was never intended to apply to the case where the agree-
ment to purchase does not become binding unless a home is com-
pleted.12 5 Such an agreement is not a sale of the lot, it is a sale of
the home. The lot is sold only if the home is there. I do not think
that the Act was supposed to cover it.
I have never seen a standard contract for the sale of a home
in a new subdivision that says that the builder will build a home.
What it says is that the builder will sell and the buyer will buy a
home if it is completed on a certain date, and if it is not completed
the contract is at an end and the buyer's deposit will be returned
to him. I cannot believe that the Interstate Land Sales Act in-
tended to change this age old practice.
Once it is conceded that the Act applies to an ordinary home
purchase if the contract does not affirmatively bind the builder
to build and to complete the home within two years, Pandora's
box is open. Practically every homebuilder in the country is vio-
lating the Act if he is building fifty homes or more and using the
mails or other instrumentalities of commerce to advertise.
OILSR did indeed open Pandora's box. In an introduction
to its regulations,12 6 the OILSR observed that the bonafide condo-
minium homebuilder need not be concerned about the change
in definition of "lot" since the obligation to complete the units
in two years is not onerous. To emphasize this point, the OILSR
informed the condominium builders that "if a condominium
dwelling unit is merely incidental to the common facilities (as
in the case of recreational developments), all common facil-
124 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3) (1970).
125 The OILSR, however, may not agree. See Comment, supra note 3, at 660-62.
126 38 Fed. Reg. 23866 (1973).
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ities must be completed within the two-year period to qualify
for the exemption since frequently vacation sites are sold with-
out assurances that such facilities will be completed."'1 27 There
was an uproar among condominium builders. Obviously the
idea that all common facilities would have to be completed with-
in two years of the first sale was an impossible suggestion in
larger developments. 128
OILSR's recent attempt to clarify its position has only made
matters worse.129 Some condominium builders could live with
the distinction which says that the common areas must be com-
pleted if the units are merely incidental to the facilities. But the
OILSR clarification published in the form of Guidelines draws
the distinction in terms of whether the facilities are "the primary
inducement to the sale."'130 Obviously most common facilities
are an inducement, and, as such, they are always "primary" with
the disappointed consumer. The applicability of the act should
not be left to such a vague standard.
Furthermore, the OILSR seems to have ignored the impli-
cations beyond the condominium. All requirements applicable
to condominiums must apply a fortiori to ordinary home sales.
After all, the OILSR discussion and Guidelines were triggered
by its conclusion that sales of condominium units involve sales
of "lots." The sale of a home on its lot always involves the sale of
a "lot." Thus unless the OILSR reverses its position or the courts
agree that it is untenable, ordinary homebuilders may have to
rewrite their contracts of sale to include an affirmative obliga-
tion to complete the home within two years.
What if, however, the homes are offered with common areas
on the homes association pattern? Can the developer avoid reg-
istration under that act without undertaking to complete all of
the areas within two years? Considering only OILSR's intention
-to give the consumer extra protection-I am bound to say that
homes associations and condominiums are indistinguishable.
But good intentions do not control the meaning of statutes.
When the Act states that the existence of, or an agreement to
build, residential, commercial, or industrial structures is suffi-
cient to exempt the sale from its scope, the Act clearly refers to
127 Id.
12 See Comment, supra note 3, at 661 n. 111.
12. 39 Fed. Reg. 7824 (1974).
13
0
Id. 7825.
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structures that are on the lot in question.131 OILSR may arguably
require completion of the common facilities in a condominium
because they are an. indivisible part of the "unit" by statute-
assuming OILSR is right that a "lot" and a "unit" are the same
thing. But OILSR has no power to require completion of im-
provements outside the lot in question, on someone else's lot.
3. SEC
I have discussed SEC's Release 5347 in my previous article.
132
Although it focuses on condominiums, I believe that it states the
SEC position for homes associations as well. If I am right in this
conclusion, a developer should not plan to have the homes as-
sociation supplement its operating budget by outside income
producing activities unless he is prepared to go through a regis-
tration. The SEC could take the position that there is a sufficient
profit motive and a sufficient reliance on the skills of the as-
sociation management to classify such an offering as an invest-
ment contract. 133 However, it seems clear that the SEC would
not find an investment contract if the association amenities are
maintained on a nonprofit basis out of assessments or user fees
collected from members.
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Unfortunately, a recent Second Circuit decision has thrown
doubt on the traditional distinction between profit motivated
ventures on the one hand and ordinary home purchases on the
other. In Forman v. Community Services, Inc. ,' 35 the court sug-
gested that cooperative housing offerings may be treated as in-
vestment contracts because the residents have an equity at risk.
The court suggested that it is a sufficient profit motive if the
unit owners expect to save some operating expenses through
a communal effort and expect to benefit from deductions for
interest and local taxes not generally available to rental apart-
ment dwellers. 136 Obviously, if these are sufficient profit mo-
tives, then all housing that combines communal maintenance
with the normal homeownership tax benefits are securities of-
ferings. I cannot believe that is right. The cooperative involved
' See text accompanying note 124 supra.
132 Krasnowiecki, supra note 1, at 349-51.
M3 See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
"' SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347 (Jan. 4, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
135 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 43 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Jan 20, 1975) (No. 74-157).
13 6 Id. at 1254.
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in the Forman case owned substantial commercial space which
was expected to generate some $1,106,000 in gross rentals. It
seems that this alone would have sufficed to provide the neces-
sary profit motive, and it is unfortunate that the court went on
to mention the others. So long as the Forman decision stands,
however, it will create serious doubt about the scope of the secur-
ities laws.
CONCLUSION
Because of the energy problem and increasing concern for
the environment, housing will have to learn to consume less of
the countryside. It will have to learn to cluster around public
transportation nodes in higher densities. 137 American housing
consumers, however, still want to own their individual home and
they want outdoor recreation close at hand. These needs and
desires lead me to believe that the townhouse will become the
predominant housing type in the years to come. Recent experi-
ences with new towns suggest that most of this development will
be in small or medium-size projects. Absent significant govern-
ment funding and involvement, the arrangements for mainte-
nance of the common areas and facilities will continue to be pri-
vate in nature.
In an earlier article, I have compared two such private ap-
proaches, the condominium 138 and the homes association. In
this Article, I have explored the homes association in more de-
tail. Obviously, I think it is a sound alternative. Its greatest vir-
tue, however, is also its greatest vice. Because it is not controlled
by statute, it is a flexible device in the hands of the draftsman
which can be molded to protect both the needs of the industry
and the interests of the housing consumer. In the hands of a
thoughtless developer it can be bent to abuse the consumer. A
proper understanding of the problems special to this form of
ownership is, therefore, a practical necessity.
137 A recently published study (sponsored jointly by CEQ, EPA & HUD) indicates
that townhouse development may have the smallest adverse environmental impact and
involve the least energy consumption per unit as compared with other forms of hous-
ing. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL 3-24 (1974).
131 The condominium, however, is subject to substantial public control. See Com-
ment, supra note 3.
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